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Finding Rights Specifically
John Safranek* and Stephen Safranek**
Sen. Schumer: "You would disagree that there is no general right to
privacy in the Constitution?"
Judge John Roberts: "I wouldn't use the phrase 'general' because I
don't know what that means."
1
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas2 reprised the
profound jurisprudential discrepancies that have polarized the Court for
decades. In Lawrence, the Justices disputed not only the constitutionality
of the contested right, but its formulation as well: the minority
characterized it as a right to homosexual sodomy,3 while the majority
formulated it as a right to privacy or liberty.4  Although the outcome
differed substantially from Bowers v. Hardwick,5 the divergent
formulations of the right resembled those of the earlier decision.6
This fundamental discrepancy in the formulation of a rights' claim
* B.A., University of San Francisco; M.D., University of Nebraska; Ph.D.,
Catholic University of America.
** Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law; B.A., University of San Francisco;
M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., University of Notre Dame.
1. William Saletan, Evasion of Privacy: The Phony Humility of John Roberts,
SLATE, Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126312.
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy).
3. Id. at 597 ("Bowers' conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental
right 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' is utterly unassailable.").
4. Id. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
5. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional right to
homosexual sodomy).
6. Id. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy .. "); id. at 208 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the
intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's
protection of privacy.").
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is not confined to the issue of homosexual sodomy. In numerous
important due process cases, the Court could not agree on whether the
controlling legal tradition should be framed in general or specific terms.
8
Does the practice of abortion implicate a more general right to liberty
and privacy or should it be specified narrowly as a right to abortion?9
Can the right to assisted-suicide be adjudicated without broader concern
for a right to die and autonomy? 10 The jurisprudential issue, which is
one of methodology, is whether rights' claims should be articulated in
specific or general terms.
The Justices' formulation of the rights' claim ultimately governs
their decisions because neither the Constitution nor specific legal
traditions explicitly protect most of these controverted acts."1 Therefore,
if jurists specify the rights' claims narrowly, as in Bowers,12 they reject
the right because no specific legal tradition exists to overturn the extant
statute. 13  However, if the Justices formulate the right in the general
terms of autonomy or privacy, which are integral to due process liberty,
the right is recognized, as seen in Lawrence.14  Thus, the general or
specific formulation of a rights' claim governs the outcome of some of
the most controversial constitutional disputes.15
7. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text,
8. By general, we mean that the principle is formulated to cover a wider range of
cases, and correlatively, by specific, we mean a narrower range of cases. See Don Loeb,
Generality and Moral Justification, 56 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 79, 81 (1996).
We do not mean range in a numerical sense as does Frederich Schauer. The Generality
of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 229 (terming a law such as "Speed Limit 55" a general
law because it applies to everyone without exception). Our sense of general is a
principle, such as the right to liberty discussed infra, which is applicable in many
different types of cases.
9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.Supp. 1454, 1459-60 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (quoting Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))
("Like the abortion decision, the decision of a terminally ill person to end his or her
life ... constitutes a 'choice central to personal dignity and autonomy."'); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997) ("[A]lthough Cruzan is often described as a
'right to die' case, we were, in fact, more precise: We assumed that the Constitution
granted competent persons a 'constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition."') (citations omitted).
11. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-96 nn.5-8, for an exhaustive list of legal
proscriptions of sodomy historically.
12. See id. at 194-96.
13. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 769-70 (Souter, J., concurring) ("When identifying and
assessing the competing interests of liberty and authority, for example, the breadth of
expression that a litigant or a judge selects in stating the competing principles will have
much to do with the outcome and may be dispositive ... [j]ust as results in substantive
due process cases are tied to the selections of statements of the competing interests .....
14. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) ("The more abstractly one states the
[Vol. 111:4
FINDING RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY
Although this methodological issue is of great import, few scholars
or jurists have offered robust justifications for formulating rights in either
specific or general terms.' 6 Justice Scalia enjoined the methodological
debate in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,17 stating that he would formulate the
contested right at the most specific level at which he could identify a
relevant tradition.1 8 His assertion provoked a thorough discussion of this
issue in an influential critique offered by Laurence H. Tribe and Michael
C. Dorf.' 9  Their theory offers the most compelling argument for
interpreting rights in general terms, and correlatively, for justifying the
most important due process liberty rights of the last four decades.20
Tribe and Dorf claim that jurists should articulate rights in general
terms, such as the right to intimate association, rather than specify rights
narrowly, such as the right to homosexual sodomy.21 To vindicate their
theory, they must defend the constitutional imperative for generalizing
rights and then offer a method for formulating rights' at the appropriate
level of generality. Tribe's and Dorf's theory fails because the canons of
logic, rather than jurisprudential principle, undermine their argument for
generalizing rights and support Justice Scalia's theory of specifying
already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed fight will fall within
its protection.").
16. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971) (explaining jurists' responsibility to define and derive a rights'
claim neutrally); Paul Brest, Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1085 (1981)
("The indeterminacy and manipulability of levels of generality is closely related ... to
the arbitrariness inherent in accommodating fundamental rights with competing
government interests."). Other scholars have briefly discussed Justice Scalia's or Tribe &
Dorf's theories. See Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt To Impose a
Rule of Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853, 885-87 (1991)
(briefly defending Justice Scalia's Theory); Timothy L. Rattschke Shattuck, Justice
Scalia's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2743, 2769-70 (1992) (arguing that Justice Scalia chooses the most specific tradition
available); L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice Scalia's History and Tradition: the Chief
Nightmare in Professor Tribe's Anxiety Closet, 78 VA. L. REV. 581, 600-18 (1992)
(prescinding from discussing the merits of Justice Scalia's theory and merely arguing that
Justice Scalia has not always chosen the most specific tradition in a number of cases);
Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia 's Due Process Traditionalism Applied To
Territorial Jurisdiction: the Illusion of Adjudication without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV.
981, 1030 (1992) (recounting Tribe & Dorf's criticism of the difficulty of establishing a
metric for Justice Scalia's theory of specification discussed infra, Part IV Section B).
17. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
18. Id. at 127 n.6. For footnote quoted in full, see infra notes 160-61 and
accompanying text.
19. See generally Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15.
20. Their theory justifies rights to contraception, abortion, assisted-suicide, and
homosexual rights. See id. at 1108 for the types of acts not justified by their theory.
21. Id. at 1067 (arguing that the right to intimate association would protect plaintiff-
Hardwick's conduct).
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rights narrowly.22
This study is divided into three parts. Part II critiques Professors
Tribe's and Dorf s theory of generalizing rights;23 Part III discusses the
logical impediments to generalizing rights; 24 and Part IV explores Justice
Scalia's method for specifying rights.25  Although the critique is
applicable to most general rights' claims, it concentrates on due process
rights, the focus of Tribe's and Dorf s theory.
26
II. The Generality of Rights' Claims
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for modem due process
liberty in Griswold v. Connecticut,27 recognizing a narrow right for
married couples to purchase contraceptives.28 Subsequently, the Court
generalized due process liberty as the right to "autonomous control over
the development and expression of one's intellect, interest, tastes and
personality,, 29 "the ability... to define one's identity,, 30 and "choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy. 31  The following section
critiques Tribe's and Dorf's theory, particularly its justification of the
Court's generalization of due process liberty.32
A. The Theory of Generalizing Rights
Professors Tribe and Dorf criticize Justice Scalia's attempt to
specify rights' claims narrowly.33 In Michael H., Justice Scalia stated
that his method of rights' specification examines "the most specific level
22. Cass Sunstein does not hold Justice Scalia's position discussed infra that judges
should specify precedents and tradition as specifically as possible. In fact he criticizes
Justice Scalia for the "width" of his rules and his "elaborate understanding of the
Constitution's substantive commitments." CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 62, 213
(1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court generally should adjudicate on as narrow and
shallow grounds as possible, such as invoking the principle of desuetude to overrule
Hardwick). Inexplicably, Sunstein does not discuss Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael
H. or his theory of specifying rights' narrowly. Nor does Sunstein address how Casey
affects his categorization of Justice Scalia as a maximalist and Justice O'Connor,
Stevens, and Souter as minimalists. Our discussion reveals the unlimited breadth of the
due process favored by these three purported minimalists. Sunstein's work is critiqued in
greater depth below.
23. See discussion infra Part II.
24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See generally Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15.
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. Id. at 485-86.
29. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
30. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
31. Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
32. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1099.
33. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1087-95.
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at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified., 34 Conversely, Tribe and Dorf insist that
the Supreme Court should articulate rights in general terms.35  This
section examines their constitutional argument for generalizing rights.
Tribe and Dorf justify abstracting general constitutional rights from
specific rights' claims by appeal to Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v.
Ullman3 6 and the Ninth Amendment.37 Justice Harlan claimed that the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion .... It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. ,38
Tribe and Dorf endorse Harlan's approach of abstracting higher
unifying principles from the specific liberties protected by the Bill of
Rights.39 These principles encompass those logically presupposed or
instrumentally required by those explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution.40 For example, specific constitutional rights of free speech
or religion are tenable only if protected by broader rights to freedom of
thought or conscience.41
Moreover, constitutional jurisprudence is "rational" only if jurists
connect precedents and clauses of the Constitution by abstracting proper
unifying principles. 4 2 A principle, according to Tribe and Dorf, unifies
one's intuitions about specific fact situations "at a higher level of
abstraction." 43 The unifying principles are the more abstract or general
rights that link the more specific rights. Thus, constitutional rights
concerning marital, procreative, and childrearing decisions are unified by
the general and unenumerated right to control the nature of one's
intimate associations.44
Tribe and Dorf defend the existence of this unenumerated right by
adverting to the Ninth Amendment's requirement that "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people. 45  Although proscriptive in
34. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
35. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1099.
36. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
38. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1068.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 1069.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1068.
44. Id. at 1069.
45. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1100 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
2007]
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character, this rule of construction also plays a prescriptive role in
Tribe's and Dorf's theory.4 6  They argue that the Ninth Amendment
prescribes the generalization of rights to prevent the elevation of
enumerated rights above the unenumerated.47 Exalting enumerated rights
as "islands of special protection" 48 would disparage the unenumerated,
"those that remain 'underwater."' 49  The Ninth Amendment thereby
condones Justice Harlan's methodology and affirms the act of
generalizing rights-in regard to tradition and legal precedent-at higher
levels of abstraction.50
Professors Tribe and Dorf claim that their theory of generalizing
rights constrains jurists from importing their personal values into
constitutional jurisprudence. They endorse the common law method to
constrain the jurist interpreting the "living Constitution" in general
terms. 51 The common law method, which requires jurists to articulate
principled distinctions between prior cases, can be applied to historical
traditions.52 For example, in Bowers the justices should have asked why
traditions for the respect of personal, intimate associations did not apply
to gay, intimate relationships.
53
Tribe's and Dorf's theory further restricts judicial activism by
requiring that the general right provide an adequate description of
previously recognized rights without reference to the novel rights'
claim.54 Justices must first determine the rationale (or "concerns" 55 ) that
influenced the precedents, and then only after describing the concerns at
the apposite level of abstraction can they test the abstraction against the
disputed rights' claim.56 And jurists must respect not only the holdings
of precedents but also their rationales.57 By applying this common law
46. Id. ("To make sense of the Ninth Amendment's proscriptive role, readers of the
Constitution must assume that it also plays aprescriptive role.") (emphasis in original).
47. See id.
48. Id. ("The Ninth Amendment counsels against the portrayal of enumerated rights
as isolated islands of special protection . .
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1102 ("The Ninth Amendment's presumption in favor of generalizing
rights applies to the interpretation of cases and traditions."); id. ("Our approach to
defining fundamental rights places precedent and historical tradition on a more or less
equal footing.").
51. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1101 ("[T]he method of the common law can
constrain a justice interpreting a living Constitution.").
52. Id.
53. Id. ("[T]he Court should have asked what justification existed for treating the
traditions regarding respect for intimate personal associations as inapplicable to gay
intimacy.").






method, the jurists are constrained when selecting the appropriate level
of generality.
Thus, Tribe and Dorf offer a theory of generalizing rights that
endorses Justice Harlan's method of abstracting novel rights, which are
justified constitutionally by the Ninth Amendment.
B. Criticisms of Tribe's and Dorf's Theory
Although Tribe's and Dorf's method of generalizing rights has been
employed by the Supreme Court for decades, it is unsupported by the
professors' interpretations and undermined by their criticisms.
Tribe and Dorf justify their theory by dubious interpretations of
both Justice Harlan's decision in Poe and the Ninth Amendment. Justice
Harlan states that Due Process liberty is not a series of isolated rights but
constitutes a "rational continuum which... includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ' '58 and that the
state's claims that abridge "certain interests require particularly careful
scrutiny. 59  However, neither of these claims requires generalizing
rights: a narrowly specified due process liberty right could be part of the
rational continuum and also require careful scrutiny. Furthermore, a
jurist cannot scrutinize whether a statute is "arbitrary" or "purposeless"
unless she considers the specific circumstances of the rights' claim, but a
general right by definition omits the particular circumstances. This
criticism will be amplified in Part III.
Tribe's and Dorf's interpretation of the Ninth Amendment also is
dubious. They assert that the Ninth Amendment equalizes enumerated
and unenumerated rights, and thereby condones Justice Harlan's theory
of generalizing rights.60  But they do not explain why the Ninth
Amendment requires a jurist to generalize rather than specify
unenumerated rights. In other words, the Founding Fathers might have
realized that the Constitution could not delineate every specific right that
they desired to protect, and therefore they clarified that these
unenumerated rights, such as the right to marry according to the
conditions and qualifications of that time, deserve as much protection as
the enumerated rights. Specified rights are wholly consistent with the
Ninth Amendment. Tribe and Dorf do not consider this alternative
before merely asserting that the Ninth Amendment prescribes Justice
Harlan's method of generalizing rights.61  But neither the Ninth
58. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1100 (stating that the Ninth Amendment
condones the "vision elaborated by Justice Harlan in his Poe dissent").
61. See id. at 1100-01 ("The Ninth Amendment... affirmatively acts as a
2007]
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Amendment nor Justice Harlan's opinion requires jurists to generalize
rights.
Tribe and Dorf illuminate the fundamental shortcoming of their
theory when they criticize the minority in Bowers for espousing a "right
to be let alone. 62 They cogently claim that this putative right raises such
questions as whether one retains this right while harming others and what
constitutes harm to others.6 3 Further, Tribe and Dorf note that an
individual could invoke this putative right whenever constrained by law.
Their point is that jurists cannot maintain a right to be let alone
simpliciter and that there are certain acts the right does not protect.64 If
this general right exists, then either it protects both praiseworthy and
pernicious behavior or some principle must be adduced to proscribe the
latter.
But Tribe's and Dorf's criticism undermines their theory of
generalizing rights. They would substitute "a less abstract formulation"
65
for the Bowers minority's right to be let alone, namely, "the fundamental
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others. 66  However, this right incurs the same
criticisms that they ascribe to "the right to be let alone. 67  Are all
intimate associations protected, including those in which one party is
harmed? And what constitutes harm? Is spousal abuse or heroin use
constitutional if performed with an intimate partner? 68 Tribe's and
Dorfs general right to "intimate association" is as problematic as the
alternative that they criticize. Thus, their theory of generalizing rights
lacks a constitutional basis and is burdened with the same criticisms they
level against the right to be let alone.
The shortcoming of Tribe's and Dorf s theory can be traced to their
understanding of a "principle.,, 69  They correctly acknowledge that a
principle might "unify our intuitions about specific fact situations at a
higher level of abstraction, 70  but they fail to grasp that only
exceptionless general principles can justify subsidiary principles. This
presumption in favor of generalizing at higher levels of abstraction.").
62. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1067.
64. See infra Part II Section B for a more thorough discussion.
65. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1067 ("These questions make clear the need for
a less abstract formulation of the right at stake .... ).
66. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Tribe denies a right to sell narcotics but defers to precedent rather than
explaining how his general right to intimate association proscribes it. Tribe & Dorf,
supra note 15, at 1 106-7(rejecting a right to sell narcotics because "only certain decisions
are fundamentally private in character."). This is discussed further infra.




criticism will be developed more thoroughly in the next section.
III. The Specificity of Rights' Claims
The terms of the Constitution do not address the question of the
proper specification of rights. In Part III it is argued that the canons of
logic, rather than jurisprudential principle, undermine Tribe's and Dorf's
theory of generalizing rights. Section A discusses the principle of non-
contradiction; Section B examines this principle's bearing on Tribe's and
Dorf's theory of generalizing rights' claims; and Section C criticizes the
concept of general rights.
A. Canons of Logic
The most fundamental principle of human reasoning is the principle
of non-contradiction. 71  This principle states that something cannot
simultaneously be and not be in all relevant regards.72 For example, a
being cannot be both a human and a canine. One could claim that a man
is also sometimes a canine, either by using the term in a pejorative sense,
speaking to the individual's behavior, or perhaps to a canine costume
donned by the individual. However, the term canine is not being
employed univocally in these instances. A being cannot be both human
and canine when these terms are used in their primary senses. The
principle of non-contradiction attests to the reality of difference in the
world.73
The principle of non-contradiction cannot be disputed, for any such
attempt must be articulated in words that the opponent intends with a
particular and non-contradictory meaning.74 Therefore the opponent's
denial of the principle also validates it.7 5 The denial is refuted in its very
articulation because the opponent is employing words that she intends
with specific meanings and not with their contradictories. Thus, the
opponent of the principle of non-contradiction must remain silent.76
The principle is important to all areas of human knowledge
including the field of law, particularly regarding the basic principle of
equality. Although many aspects of jurisprudence are controverted, no
71. 2 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1588 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton University Press
1984) ("[I]t is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be....
72. Id. at 1588-89 (discussing the qualifications of this principle).
73. It is the reality of difference that provides the distinctions necessary for a legal
system to exist. See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1961)
("The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process.").
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one disputes that similar cases should be treated similarly.77 Scholars
debate the characteristics that render cases similar but no one disputes
how jurists should adjudicate similar cases. The principle of treating like
cases alike is derived from the principle of non-contradiction because a
jurist contradicts herself if she treats two relevantly similar cases
disparately.78
The principle of non-contradiction is fundamental to rational
discourse. The claim that an opponent is contradicting herself is the
most potent argument that an individual can advance because
contradiction undermines any argument. The principle underlies all-
forms of disputes. When an individual disputes her opponent's factual
claim, she implicitly applies the principle of non-contradiction by
asserting that the factual claim is wrong. She is claiming that the
purported fact contradicts the truth, e.g., the number of Supreme Court
justices is not five but nine.
The principle of non-contradiction also governs legal and ethical
debate. For example, an interlocutor might challenge an opponent of
abortion whose opposition is grounded on the protection of human life
but who also favors capital punishment. The interlocutor apprehends a
contradiction: the proponent favors protecting human beings but killing
human beings. The proponent must articulate a principle that resolves
the apparent contradiction.79 One option is to limit her principle to
support the inviolability of all innocent human life. If her interlocutor
challenges her amended claim by noting that she supports killing the
innocent in cases of double-effect, 80 she would have to specify her
principle further to avoid this contradiction, viz., it is wrong to
[intentionally] kill innocent human beings. As she qualifies her principle
by specifying it, her interlocutor will find it more difficult to elicit
contradictions because specification circumscribes the principle and
thereby renders it less vulnerable to contradiction.
This discussion of the principle of non-contradiction illuminates the
debate between coherentists and foundationalists. In arguing for the
77. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961) ("[Ifts [justice] leading
precept is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike."').
78. See Peter Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 558
(1982) ("Claims that treatment can be simultaneously just and unequal, or equal but just,
are grounded in simple self-contradiction.").
79. The existence of the contradiction does not establish which of the contradictory
statements must be altered. R.W. BEARDSMORE, MORAL REASONING 23 (1969)
("Revealing a contradiction can't tell us which of the poles to reject.").
80. For a discussion of the traditional interpretation of the Principle of Double-
Effect, see Daniel Sulmasy & Edmund Pellegrino, The Rule of Double Effect, 159
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 545 (1999).
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rational congruence between various moral or legal principles,
81
coherentists are merely affirming the principle of non-contradiction.
Coherentists claim that a moral or legal theory must be comprised of a
set of non-contradictory principles. 82 Each principle must be congruent
with all other principles in that theory. 3 The given theory is analogous
to a crossword puzzle, in which the letters of each horizontal word must
be congruent with those of vertical words. The analogy to crossword
puzzles is appropriate because the letters of one word in a crossword will
often act as a clue to an unknown word. Similarly, a principle that is
easily grasped will shed light on a more obscure situation.
84
Any valid theory must provide tenable principles that cohere with
all the other principles in the theory. To deny coherentism is to deny the
principle of non-contradiction, and therefore the denial is undermined in
its articulation. However, coherentism alone cannot justify a moral or
legal theory because a person could establish an entire theory of
principles that are non-contradictory but are incorrect.85 Some psychotic
patients can formulate a web of principles that are non-contradictory but
nevertheless are false. The coherence of principles is a necessary but not
sufficient requirement for any moral or legal theory.
The principle of non-contradiction also sheds light on the popular
alternative to coherentism, namely, foundationalism. Foundationalists
assert a fundamental and undeniable principle that is the source of
subsidiary principles. Foundationalists correctly recognize that all
knowledge must be grounded on a certain foundation. 86 And certainly a
81. The method of analogous reasoning and the concept of precedent are illustrations
of coherentism. See Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should be a Dworkinian Coherentist, 77
TEX. L. REv. 1375, 1384 (1999).
82. See Michael DePaul, Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics, 96
MIND 463 (1987); Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance
in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979).
83. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 280 (2001) ("Our beliefs are
supported in a lattice or web .... ).
84. RICHARD MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS 232 (1996) ("Moreover, they
are more or less unambiguous, requiring no elaborate explanation. As a result, we can
use them to reason about more complicated matters, proceeding from "typical" cases to
those that are novel, ambiguous, or more elaborate."); JOHN LAIRD, THE IDEA OF VALUE
244 (1959) ("We make weaker opinions cohere with solid ones .... ); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 114 (1989) (we learn to apply the
terms "just" and "unjust" by going from simple to complex cases).
85. LAIRD, supra note 84, at 254 ("Right principle cannot be inconsistent, but the
rightness and reasonableness cannot be determined by consistency alone."). Michael C.
Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1264 (2005)
(Dorf overstates the case in claiming, "[g]iven the possibility of "bad coherence,"
coherentism seems to be a form of moral relativism.").
86. Gilbert Harmann, Positive Versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision, 18
NOUS. 39 (2003) (Some beliefs will depend on others "until one gets to foundational
beliefs that do not depend on any further beliefs for their justification."); see also Ken
2007]
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valid theory requires a foundational principle that precludes an infinite
justificatory regress. The error of some foundationalists is to propose
foundational principles which are so general that they validate
contradictory moral or legal claims. 8 For example, both proponents and
opponents of affirmative action invoke the general principle of equality.
The contradictory claims arise because the foundational claim requires
supplementary principles in order to terminate in a practical conclusion,
and these supplementary principles can conflict.89  Thus, general
foundationalist principles such as equality can garner a consensus only
by being so vague that they are impotent;90 once they are delineated into
specific practical principles, they are as disputable as other principles.
These foundational legal principles are similar to the foundational
moral principle, "Do good and avoid evil," which no one disputes as a
formal statement.9 ' But controversy ensues once practical conclusions
are drawn from it. If a formal principle generates contradictory claims,
each of which can be justified by appeal to this principle, then the
principle is useless because the moral agents obviously dispute its
meaning.92 If two moral agents can reasonably appeal to the principle of
"do good, avoid evil" to justify their respective acts of committing or
preventing acts of assisted-suicide, then the principle is useless in
resolving the morality of the act. Similarly various foundational
principles of laws such as "equal respect" can generate contradictory
legal claims. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction undermines
many foundationalist principles.
The principle of non-contradiction is indisputable and integral to
Kress, supra note 81, at 138.
87. LAIRD, supra note 84 ("[T]he prior certainties are accepted on grounds of insight
or observation-not coherence.").
88. For a discussion of compelling foundational principles of a moral theory, see
ALBERT JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USE AND ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 251-52 (1990).
Moral paradigms and axioms are the most obvious examples.
89. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 514 (1988) (stating liberty and
equality require supplementary principles in application to real cases).
90. The concept of equality is crucial and seemingly undeniable in Western law, but
as Weston has cogently argued, it is useless unless its content is explicitly delineated.
Weston, supra note 78, at 547 ("Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral
content of its own.").
91. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA, I-II, Q. 94, a.2 (terming this the first
principle of practical reason).
92. Louis SEIDMAN AND MARK TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 41 (1995) ("Perhaps
it is possible to generate wide agreement on highly abstract principles of justice ... the
very abstraction that makes agreement possible deprives the principle of much use in
practice."); see H.L.A. HART supra note 77, at 155 ("[U]ntil it is established what
resemblance and difference are relevant, 'Treat like cases alike' must remain an empty
form. To fill it we must know when, for the purposes at hand, cases are to be regarded as
alike and what differences are relevant.").
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rational discourse and jurisprudence. This logical canon of reasoning
serves as the matrix for the discussion of rights' claims in the next
section, which reveals how the principle of non-contradiction
undermines Tribe's and Dorf s theory of generalizing rights.
B. The Defeasibility of General Rights
Part II discussed Tribe's and Dorf s failure to justify generalizing
rights by appeal to Justice Harlan's Poe opinion and the Ninth
Amendment.93 This section of Part III reveals the contradictions inherent
in generalizing rights' claims at higher levels of abstraction.
Consider an individual desiring to socialize in a public park.94 If the
government tried to prevent her from doing so, she could assert her due
process right to liberty, which putatively justifies her rights claim. Her
right to socialize in the park seems incontrovertible: she is not disruptive,
inebriated, naked, using illicit drugs or inciting others to violence. A
general due process right to socialize in the park seems eminently
tenable.
In fact, this rights claim is subordinate to numerous conditions.
Among others, the individual socializing in the park cannot be disruptive,
inebriated or naked. The purportedly incontrovertible general right to
socialize in a park is contestable if all of the relevant conditions are not
satisfied by the individual. Therefore, a general right to socialize in a
park does not exist because it is limited by numerous conditions. Only a
very specified right to socialize in a public park exists.
If an individual retains a general right to an act, then she is free to
perform that act without interference. If she is not free to perform that
act, then she does not retain that general right in any meaningful sense.95
The notion that an individual possesses a general right that is overridden
in a specific instance is fatuous: if the individual cannot exercise the
right in the specified circumstance, then she does not retain the right in
that circumstance. If the individual cannot exercise her general right to
socialize in a park while "disturbing the peace," then she does not retain
the general right. The general right to socialize in a park is subject to
93. Supra Part I.B.
94. Kelly Spencer, Sex Offenders and the City: Ban Orders, Freedom of Movement,
and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 297 (2002) (arguing that a pedophile
has a right to visit a park based on a general right to travel).
95. For a dubious attempt to explain how one can retain a right that can be violated,
see DIANA MEYER, INALIENABLE RIGHTS 60-61 (1985) (explaining how an agent can
abridge a right to life or liberty without violating it); HENRY VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS:
FACT OR FANCY? 179 (1985) offers a more cogent argument, namely, that only limited
rights can be justified. ("Besides, even if on natural law princicples one were to hold that
an individual's rights to his life, liberty, and property are limited, albeit inalienable, it
would still seem not just likely, but practically unavoidable ... ")
2007]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
contradictions, namely, all the conditions that specify the general right:
one cannot claim that there is a general right to socialize in a park but
that there is no right to socialize in a park if a person is disruptive or
inebriated. These conditions function as exceptions that vitiate the
general right by contradicting it. The contradiction is resolved either by
specifying the general right or denying that there are any circumstances
that limit the general right to socialize in a park. The latter alternative is
indefensible.
The mistaken notion of general rights retains plausibility because
jurists and scholars illustrate this concept with putatively incontestable
general rights, such as the right to marry.96 Most people would assent to
the concept of a general right to marry because it is a practice that most
are free to perform. But no general right to marry exists because the
potential parties must satisfy a variety of conditions: they must be of a
certain age; 97 neither party can be coerced or contemporaneously
married;98 both must be unrelated to certain degrees. 99 The putative
general right to marry is subordinate to these specifications. Therefore
only a specific right to marry exists. All other general rights, even one as
fundamental as a right to life, must be similarly specified.
The deficiency of Tribe's and Dorf's theory is that there are no
meaningful "general" rights. General rights are useless for adjudication
because they are not prescriptive, that is, they cannot justify rights to any
specific acts. A "general" right to liberty or marriage exists if general
means that most citizens are able to satisfy the conditions necessary to
exercise the i-ight. However, this sense of a general right does not justify
any specific rights because it is descriptive rather than prescriptive: it
merely states the fact that most individuals are in fact able to fulfill the
conditions that specify the right. 100
One also could speak of a "general" right if the term expresses the
genus of many specific rights. For example, the general right to liberty
encompasses both a right to socialize in a park if the individual is not
inebriated, disruptive, etc., and the right to marry under another set of
96. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (The liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also [for
example] the... right to marry, establish a home and bring up children."); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S.12, 12 (1967) (claiming that the law deprived the Lovings of due
process by denying them the "freedom of choice to marry").
97. Age and being unmarried are common qualifications. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT
§ 25.05.011 (Matthew Bender 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-122 (1999); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 301 (West 2004).
98. Id.
99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13 § 101 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1997).
100. See John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Can the Right to Autonomy Be
Resuscitated After Glucksberg, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 733-736 (1998) (discussing the
analogous descriptive and prescriptive aspects of a right to autonomy).
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conditions. After these particular rights have been justified and
specified, one could classify these same rights under a "general" right to
socialize or marry, and then one can generalize these further to a general
right to liberty. But this use also is descriptive rather than prescriptive
because it merely classifies in general terms the rights that have been
justified in specific circumstances.
If another circumstance arises where the specific right is disputed,
such as socializing after a curfew, an individual can neither justify her
claim by generalizing it to a right to socialize nor as a right to liberty
because the issue is whether this specific act in these circumstances
should be afforded constitutional protection. This is precisely the
Supreme Court's practice that Tribe's and Dorf's theory defends. While
Tribe and Dorf invoke a general right to intimate association to justify
homosexual sodomy, the Court adverts to the general rights of liberty,
privacy or autonomy. 01 But these general rights do not exist because
they must be qualified by numerous exceptions in practice. The Supreme
Court, however, can justify the due process liberty rights by analogy to
relevantly similar precedents if these precedents have been identified and
specified sufficiently. The logical problem for the Court, and for Tribe
and Dorf, is that the Court has justified many of these precedents by
appealing to general rights that are subject to numerous exceptions.0 2 If
the general right is defeasible, and the relevant precedents are grounded
on the general right, then the precedents are unjustified. Therefore, by
appealing to the general right, the Court begs the question of whether the
disputed act is another exception. First the Court must find some other
basis to justify a right to the specific act and then it can classify the right
under the genus of rights to liberty.
The jurist must examine the specific circumstances of the rights'
claim to determine whether the specific right exists. If she decides that it
does, then the right can be classified as one of those acts that liberty
protects. As William Galston has noted, the recognition of a right is the
conclusion rather than the origin of legal reasoning.'0 3 One must first
justify the legitimacy of the specific act before a right to the act can be
recognized.
Tribe and Dorf, by contrast, abstract a general right from the
101. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15 at 1066-67.
102. Most of the Supreme Court's controversial due process jurisprudence, including
contraception, abortion, and homosexual sodomy is grounded on the general right to
privacy, liberty, or autonomy. See id. Griswold is slightly exceptional insofar as the
Court somewhat limited the right to zonal privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965).
103. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE COMMON GOOD 141 (1980) (stating that
a right is the outcome or result of moral reasons).
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disputed specific right and then employ the general right as the
justification for the disputed right. 0 4 For example, the specific right to
homosexual sodomy is abstracted as a claim to the general right to
intimate association and because this general right putatively justifies
acts analogous to homosexual sodomy, it thereby justifies homosexual
sodomy. But the general right does not exist if it is circumscribed in any
instance. If a general right to intimate association exists, then Tribe and
Dorf must argue that all intimate acts are protected. But because they
admit that not every intimate act is protected,10 5 then no general right to
intimate association exists. Therefore, they cannot justify the right to
homosexual sodomy merely because it is an instance of an intimate act.
Moreover, they offer no criteria to distinguish intimate acts that are
constitutional from those that are unconstitutional.1
0 6
The concept of general rights is untenable because general rights
generate contradictions proportionate to their degree of generality. As a
right is articulated in more general terms, it is subject to more exceptions.
Conversely, a right that is properly specified is less subject to
contradiction. For example, a general right to life is subject to the
exceptions of killing in self-defense, capital punishment or double-effect.
However, a specific right to life for an individual who is innocent of any
crime, and does not threaten another person, is less subject to
contradiction. Hence, general rights generate contradictions; specific
rights limit them.
C. The Conundrum of General Rights
The previous section discussed how general rights generate
contradiction. This section presents a bolder claim: that a general due
process liberty right is self-contradictory. If this claim is valid, then
jurists err by appealing to a general "right to liberty" in justifying due
104. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1103 ("Only after the Court has selected the
appropriate level of abstraction at which to describe these concerns should it test the
asserted specific right against that abstraction.").
105. Id. at 1107.
106. Tribe and Dorf claim that the sale of narcotics between consenting adults would
run afoul of the Supreme Court's privacy rationale that only certain decisions are
fundamentally private in character because "a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of the government." Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15,
at 1106-07 (citing Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
772, 772 (1986)). Tribe and Dorf fail to offer any distinction between private drug use
and the pertinent privacy precedents. Stephen Gardbaum, a liberal proponent of
autonomy, admits that the principle of liberty cannot coherently proscribe drug use, but
claims that perhaps other liberal values such as human dignity or equality might trump
the right to drug use. Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy and Moral Conflict, 48




A general due process liberty right is untenable because all human
acts can be classified as acts of liberty. 10 7 A general right to liberty
would justify murder, treason, and assault because these can be freely
chosen.'0 8 An interlocutor could correctly assert that these are forbidden
by common law or tradition because of the harm inflicted, but she
thereby acknowledges that no general right to liberty exists; rather, only
certain free acts are legitimate.10 9 Either a general right to liberty exists
and therefore pernicious acts should be protected, or no general due
process liberty right exists.
But the untenability of this general right is even more egregious: a
due process liberty right is self-contradictory. The essence of the self-
contradiction is that when jurists uphold a right on the basis of liberty,
they deny liberty to those opposed to the disputed right.11 In other
words, they deny someone's liberty in the name of someone else's
liberty."' Similarly, the Supreme Court denies some citizens' autonomy
or privacy in the name of upholding others' autonomy or privacy right.
If rights to liberty, autonomy or privacy protect important personal
decisions, then the Court necessarily violates these rights by upholding
some individuals' important decisions at the expense of others'
choices. "'2
In Bowers, Justice Blackmun illustrated the self-contradictory
character of a general due process rights when he attempted to justify the
extension of the privacy right to the act of homosexual sodomy. 
113
Justice Blackmun noted that the Court had previously recognized that the
107. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 245-46 (1986) (arguing that there is no
right to liberty because it is too indiscriminate).
108. RONALD DWOKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 267 (1977) ("It diminishes a
man's liberty when we prevent him from... making love as he wishes, but it also limits
it when we prevent him from murdering ... ").
109. See id. at 267-73 (offering a probative argument against a general right to liberty,
which leads Dworkin to ground fundamental rights on the principle of equality).
110. See John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Licensing Liberty: The Self-
Contradictions of Substantive Due Process, 2 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 231, 246 (1998) ("The
conundrum facing contemporary liberals is that although they esteem autonomy as a
fundamental good, they cannot countenance all autonomous acts; but in proscribing
certain depraved acts or lifestyles, liberals violate a person's autonomy.").
111. ANDREW LEVINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY 128-29
(1981) (arguing that granting some citizens a right restricts others' freedom).
112. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, Self-Defense, in IN HARM'S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL
FEINBERG 265 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994) ("When a liberal state
enforces the criminal law... it also vindicates the sovereignty of the individual by
punishing and condemning conduct that violates the person's right to self-
determination."). Hampton and many other scholars do not recognize that the criminal's
sovereignty is violated by the state.
113. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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ability to define one's identity is central to any concept of liberty, 14 and
that the right to privacy protects decisions important to one's destiny.'
15
Blackmun then considered whether the right to privacy
encompassed public sexual acts, which common law and tradition have
proscribed. Justice Blackmun faced the dilemma of rejecting a right to
public sexual acts while upholding a fundamental decisional privacy
right that for some individuals might include defining themselves by
public sexual acts. 1
6
Justice Blackmun's response illustrates the self-contradiction
inherent in the general right to liberty. Blackmun writes:
Petitioner and the Court fail to see the difference between laws that
protect public sensibilities and those that enforce private morality.
Statutes banning public sexual activity are entirely consistent with
protecting the individual's liberty interest in decisions concerning
sexual relations: the same recognition that those decisions are
intensely private which justifies protecting them from governmental
interference can justify protecting individuals from unwilling
exposure to the sexual activities of others.' '
7
Blackmun merely asserts that "the same recognition" justifies self-
defining decisions to engage in homosexual sodomy and proscribes self-
defining public sexual acts. He characterizes homosexual sodomy as an
"intensely private" decision and exhibitionism as an act.' He had to
characterize them in this manner or he would have been unable to
distinguish them if he characterized both properly, viz., private decisions
that are enacted. What is the "same recognition" or principle that
distinguishes these practices? Both acts can be integral to self-definition,
offensive to a certain segment of the population, and intensely personal.
Proponents of either act can argue that offended persons need to
overcome their antiquated mores, visceral antipathies, or pervasive
animus.'1 9 Indeed, opponents' "unwillingness" to view the public sexual
act could be a manifestation of their animus.
The Court could attempt to distinguish exhibitionism from
homosexual sodomy by claiming that the former act is publicly displayed
114. Id. at 205 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)
("[T]he 'ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty' cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum.").
115. See id. at 204 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has recognized a privacy
interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make).
116. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
117. Id. at 212-13.
118. Id. at 213.
119. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 634 ("[L]aws of this kind now before us raise the




and thus can be offensive while the latter is not. But the Court has
transformed due process liberty to protect decisional privacy rather than
private acts in part because many privacy rights upheld by the Court defy
characterization as "private." Griswold, for example, could be described
as a private act because it regulated a married couple's actions in the
privacy of their home. 120  Other acts are not so readily described as
private acts. The act of abortion is performed at public clinics and
involves commercial transactions. Moreover, the precedents that
generated the privacy right, which concerned the education of children in
schools, did not concern private acts but private decisions. 12' Thus, the
Supreme Court had to transform the due process right to liberty, privacy
or autonomy from protecting private acts to protecting decisions. 
1 22
If due process liberty protects decisions crucial to personhood, and
this right to liberty encompasses "intensely private" sexual decisions, as
Justice Blackmun claims, 123 then the individual logically should retain a
right to perform public sexual acts that she has privately chosen.
124
Conversely, if the government protects individuals from the private
decisions of exhibitionists, then Blackmun must explain why the
government does not protect individuals from the harms they perceive
from the private decisions of homosexuals or others.
The dilemma that general rights to liberty, autonomy or privacy
create for the Supreme Court is that countless decisions are "intensely
,,125private. Both the decision to engage in, or prevent, acts of
exhibitionism, homosexual sodomy, or assisted-suicide can be crucial to
an individual's personhood. If liberty or autonomy is a good that the
Constitution protects, then the Court must articulate a principle to
distinguish those private decisions that are constitutional. But any
criteria would violate the private decisions of those who have adopted
contrary criteria in defining their personhoods.1
26
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv 737, 743 (1989)
(conceding that Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), did not concern private acts in the home).
122. For a concise critique of the right to autonomy from a proponent of the right to
abortion, see id. at 754-55 ("Where is our self-definition not at stake? Virtually every
action a person takes could arguably be said to be an element of his self-definition.")
(emphasis in original).
123. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213.
124. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 103 (1997) ("It is not
recorded that any American government, from the founding on, has ever thought it
worthwhile to compel anyone's concept of meaning or of the mystery of human life.").
125. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213.
126. For a cogent argument that an individual loses autonomy whenever the law
forces him to act contrary to his choice, see ROBERT WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM
(1970).
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The Court possesses no methodology, jurisprudential or otherwise,
to resolve these contradictory rights' claims that are justified by appeal to
the same general right. The Court would have to construct a hierarchy of
self-defining acts or their correlative harms, but this would deny
individuals the right to define their lives with a discrepant hierarchy.
And finding a constitutional basis for this hierarchy would be
problematic. 127  Because the Court's concept of harm encompasses
psychological suffering, 128  any individual, including the sexual
exhibitionist, suffers harm when the Court proscribes his liberty claim to
perform or prevent a specific act. As Robert Bork notes, the Supreme
Court would have to choose between the gratifications of the disputants
by weighing "the respective claims to pleasure., 129  Thus, Justice
Blackmun could not articulate a cogent response to the theoretical rights'
claim of the exhibitionist. 13 Nor could the Court rebut Justice Scalia's
claim in Casey that the right to autonomy would justify numerous rights
that the Court had previously rejected.
131
This criticism vitiates the methodology of Tribe and Dorf, as well as
the Court's, because generalizing a right subjects it to more
contradictions. The right to marry, if it is specified so that the parties
must be uncoerced, of appropriate age and sex, and unrelated, would be
subject to few contradictions; but if this rights' claim is merely
generalized as the right to marry, it would be subject to more
contradictions, e.g., that there is a right to marry but not a right to marry
in cases of coercion or consanguinity.132 The general right to liberty
creates the most contradictions, and indeed is self-contradictory, because
it is the most general right.
Although general rights are untenable, specification per se does not
127. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 73 (1991) (stating that liberal societies believe in certain goods, but
lack any principle to mediate conflicts between them)..
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating that maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the pregnant woman a distressful life or future psychological
harm); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) ("We agree with the District Court that
the medical judgment [to perform an abortion] may be exercised in light of all factors-
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-
being of the patient.") (citation omitted).
129. Bork, supra note 16, at 9.
130. Nor most other sexual acts; see JOHN GARVEY, MEN ONLY, in MORALITY, HARM,
AND THE LAW 128 (G. Dworkin ed., Westview Press 1994) ("If individuals are free to
choose their form of sex, then bestiality and adultery should be allowed.").
131. See Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that a right to define one's identity would justify rights to
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide).
132. Rubenfeld, supra note 121, at 783 (questioning that if the right to marry is




guarantee the constitutionality of the right. Cass Sunstein offers a
provocative argument that the Supreme Court should eschew general
principles of constitutional jurisprudence and resolve cases as narrowly
as possible in order to garner a majority, avoid error, and preclude
deleterious consequences. 133  He claims, for example, that the Court
unwisely adjudicated Roe v. Wade by recognizing a general right to
abortion; instead it should have recognized a narrow right to abortion in
the case of rape, which the plaintiff in Roe claimed was the circumstance
of the conception. 34 The problem with Sunstein's theory is that even
specific rights must be anchored to the constitution, and therefore, even
minimalists such as Sunstein must ultimately appeal to general
constitutional principles. 35 This constitutional necessity explains Tribe's
and Doff's desire to generalize specific rights' claims.
General rights generate uncertainty in constitutional law because a
general liberty claim encompasses nearly any right. The undefined
parameters of a general right to liberty generates more litigation,
followed by disappointment, and then finally harm when acts central to
an individual's autonomy are legally proscribed. 136 Conversely, the most
specified rights are least susceptible to contradiction and dubitability.
The "common law" is relatively stable because it has been specified by
thousands of cases over centuries. The common law specification of an
act such as assault is comprehensive and thus, minimizes contradiction:
jurists are constrained by centuries of jurisprudence that have delineated
133. See CASS SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 49-53.
134. Id. at 251 (The Supreme Court "might have said, most minimally, that someone
who alleges (as did Roe herself) that she was raped may not be required to bring the child
to term.").
135. An illustration of Sunstein's problem is his attempt to analogize equal protection
cases such as Romer to the paradigmatic equal protection case of discrimination against
newly freed slaves. Id. at 155. Analogizing requires the articulation of a principle to
explain both the paradigm and the novel case, and the paradigm has to be cast in general
terms to be applicable to the novel case, otherwise no relevant constitutional basis could
be found to analogize newly freed slaves with homosexuals in contemporary Colorado.
Sunstein can not offer this appropriately general constitutional principle to analogize the
paradigmatic instance of equal protection because it would undermine his endeavor to
decide cases on narrow grounds. See Richard A. Posner, Reasoning By Analogy, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 761, 765 (2006) ("One always requires a general understanding of
some sort in order to determine relevant similarities."). Sunstein, by contrast, generally
disclaims broad principles of constitutional jurisprudence, both in terms of justificatory
principles and specific rights' claims, but he ultimately must invoke them to find
applicable precedents and to furnish a constitutional basis. For example, he justifies the
right to abortion by a right to avoid bodily invasion, CASS SUYNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 92,
but this is a general right. Justice Scalia's originalism admittedly is broad insofar as this
theory can be applied broadly to establish a multitude of specific rights, but Justice Scalia
has never precluded the use of broadly applied principles such as originalism.
136. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 406 (1985) (explaining
litigation results from uncertainty and vagueness).
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the specific factors that constitute assault. 137 Therefore, jurists should
specify rights as narrowly as necessary to preclude contradiction. At a
minimum, they must not invoke general rights to liberty or autonomy,
which violate the principle of non-contradiction.1
38
IV. Criticisms of Justice Scalia's Theory
Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan illustrate two possible methods
for classifying rights' claims in Michael H. v. Gerald D.13 9 Tribe and
Dorf criticize Justice Scalia's circumscriptive method while arguing for
Justice Brennan's expansive approach. This section examines Justice
Scalia's position and his interlocutors' criticisms.
In Michael H., Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in upholding a
California Supreme Court decision that denied parental rights to the
purported biological father of a child who was conceived by a mother
married to another man. 140 The majority stated that a biological father
and adulterous mother have not historically been treated as a family unit
by society while society has treated the marital family as the family unit
whether biological or not. 141 In dissent, Justice Brennan claimed that
certain precedents upheld a fundamental liberty interest in the parent-
child relationship.142  Justice Scalia criticized as arbitrary Justice
Brennan's abstraction of a liberty interest in the "parent-child"
relationship. Justice Scalia offered a more specific characterization of
the biological father's rights' claim:
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the
societal tradition regarding the natural father's rights vis-it-vis a child
whose mother is married to another man, Justice Brennan would
137. We are not advocating the common law method as the paradigm of constitutional
adjudication, in part because it is judge-made law and in part because it is so narrow that
it is less useful for lower court jurists who are attempting to adjudicate related cases. See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79
(1989) (stating that the Supreme Court reviews so few cases that it should provide some
guidance to lower courts).
138. The obvious rejoinder this invites from liberal scholars is that the Supreme Court
would not be able to expand individual freedom if it must narrowly specify rights. But
even this result must be more acceptable to liberal scholars than condoning a method that
leads to contradiction.
139. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
140. Id. at 110-12.
141. Id. at 124 ("Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as
a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other
basis it has been accorded special protection. We think it impossible to find that it has.").
142. These precedents included Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),




choose to focus instead upon "parenthood." Why should the relevant
category not be even more general-perhaps "family relationships"; or
"personal relationships"; or even "emotional attachments in general"?
Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would
select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified. 143
This section examines Tribe's and Dorf's three criticisms of Justice
Scalia's specification of rights as seen in this case: first, his endeavor to
abstract rights from societal traditions is not value-neutral; 44 second, he
fails to offer a metric of specificity by which to measure an asserted
right;145 and third, his theory would entail judicial abdication of
responsibility for individual rights.
146
A. Traditions and Values
The first putative deficiency of Justice Scalia's theory is that his
extraction of fundamental rights from historical traditions is laden with
value choices. 147 Tribe and Dorf claim that if the law is grounded on
tradition, then judges must choose between divergent behaviors that are
"widely practiced and longstanding."'' 48  For example, in regard to
traditions regarding the family, judges must choose between
heterosexuality and homosexuality as well as other non-nuclear family
arrangements which are widely practiced and longstanding. 149 Hence,
they inevitably make a value-laden choice even when relying on
historical traditions. 50
But this criticism is grounded on a concept of "tradition" that does
not distinguish between praiseworthy and invidious acts. If "tradition"
consists of any acts that have been "widely" practiced throughout
history, then acts such as fraud and spousal abuse merit constitutional
privilege. And although historically some citizens have engaged in
homosexual relationships, societies have not esteemed or protected them;
indeed traditionally, they have punished and ostracized them, as Tribe
has elsewhere acknowledged.' 51 Tribe and Dorf correctly assert that
143. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
144. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1086.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. ("[T]he extraction of fundamental rights from societal traditions is no more
value-neutral than the extraction of fundamental rights from legal precedent.").
148. Id. at 1087 ("If tradition sufficed, the law would readily protect .,. any number
of... behaviors that are widely practiced and longstanding.").
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943-44 (The Found.
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homosexual sodomy is opposed by "majoritarian" values, but only
because majorities have historically opposed and legally proscribed it.
An alternative view is that a more certain guide to the traditions of
the United States is to discover those acts that a majority of citizens or
their representatives have consistently proscribed or prescribed by law.
These laws provide a public record of the traditions embraced by
majorities. Tribe and Dorf denigrate these "legally cognizable
'traditions"' because their description is subject to manipulation by
judges. 52 This claim might be valid regarding certain obscure traditions
but others are less vulnerable to manipulation. Some majoritarian values,
such as proscriptions of homosexual sodomy, are delineated in the
United States legal tradition.1
53
Tribe and Dorf dismiss even clear historical traditions "because
even when we discover a clear historical tradition it is hardly obvious
what the existence of that tradition tells us about the Constitution's
meaning."'' 54 This claim is valid if one dismisses historical tradition as a
constitutional touchstone, but if not, a historical tradition offers a
measure of guidance regarding the constitutionality of certain rights'
claims. The Supreme Court repeatedly has asserted that the Nation's
traditions offer guidance to a right's fundamental character.1 55 Hence,
Tribe's and Dorf's disparagement of Justice Scalia's use of tradition as
either indeterminate or steeped in majoritarian values is untenable,
particularly in regard to many obvious legal traditions.
B. The Metric of Specificity
The second deficiency that Tribe and Dorf ascribe to Justice
Scalia's theory lies in Scalia's sixth footnote in the opinion.156 Tribe and
Dorf deny the existence of a universal measure of specificity that can be
applied to a disputed right.157  In Michael H., Justice Scalia rejected
Justice Brennan's generalization of the disputed right as one of
"parenthood."'' 58 Instead Justice Scalia characterized it as the right of "a
natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant
Press Inc. 1978) ("[T]he history of homosexuality has been largely a history of
disapproval and disgrace."). Id. at 944.
152. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1087.
153. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) for an enumeration of anti-
sodomy laws.
154. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1089.
155. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
156. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1086.
157. Id.
158. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
[Vol. 111:4
FINDING RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY
marital union that wishes to embrace the child."' 5 9 Scalia added in the
sixth footnote that the basis for choosing this level of specificity is
obtained by consulting the relevant tradition governing the asserted
right. 60 He states that "if no societal tradition existed either supporting
or denying the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously
conceived, [the Court] would have to consult, and (if possible) reason
from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general."' 6 ' Justice
Scalia claims that traditions regarding natural fathers in general would be
the next most specific level of generality.
Tribe and Dorf criticize Justice Scalia's formulation of the right
contested in Michael H. as "arbitrary" and "value-laden."'' 62 They claim
that, at a minimum, the natural father's longstanding relationship with
the child should also be included. So the appropriate level of specificity
should be the "rights of the natural father of a child conceived in an
adulterous but longstanding relationship, where the father has played a
major, if sporadic, role in the child's early development."'
' 63
But Justice Scalia's specification of the disputed rights' claim in
Michael H. is neither arbitrary nor value-laden: it is determined by the
language of the disputed statute. In Michael H., the governing California
statute described paternity by stating that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent nor sterile, is
presumed to be a child of the marriage, and that this presumption may be
rebutted only by the husband or wife, and then only in limited
circumstances.1 '64 Justice Scalia's specification of the case and search for
the relevant tradition are derived from the statute's description of
paternity. 65 Contrary to Tribe's and Dorf's claim, the dispute cannot be
specified in terms of the biological father's loving relationship with his
daughter because the statute does not include this proviso. Tribe and
Dorf admit that even if one inserted the father's long-standing
relationship into Justice Scalia's specification, no relevant tradition exists
that would support their formulation of the rights' claim.1 66 But they fail
to explain why a jurist must further generalize the right instead of merely
159. Id.
160. Id. ("We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.").
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1091 ("[Justice Scalia] cannot escape the value-laden choice of a level, and
a direction, of abstraction.").
163. Id. at 1092.
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2006).
165. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) ("What counts is whether the
States in fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived
within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child.").
166. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1092 ("It is unlikely that any tradition addresses
this very question at this precise level of specificity.").
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upholding the statute when no relevant tradition is discovered.
Although Tribe and Dorf err in specifying Michael H.'s rights'
claim, their discussion illuminates several factors that should govern a
jurist's specification of a right and search for the relevant tradition. First,
a jurist should not specify a right in general terms that are contradicted
by exceptions unless she is willing to resolve the contradictions. The
contradiction can be internal, such as the self-contradictory right to
liberty, or can involve precedent, as in Casey.167 The former is not
amenable to resolution, while the latter can be resolved by qualifying one
of the two statements for the sake of coherence. A legal ruling is
untenable if jurists are unable or unwilling to resolve the contradiction.
Second, jurists can specify properly only by determining the
relevant characteristics of the case. Indeed, the issue of relevance is
central to the specification debate. A single human act can be described
in myriad ways. An act of first-degree murder can be characterized as
acting autonomously, pulling a trigger, discharging a firearm, shooting
another person, killing another person, or murder, among others. The
number of descriptions can be multiplied by inserting "voluntary" or
"involuntary" into most of these descriptions.
Should a jurist interpret the act as generally as possible, i.e., an
autonomous act, or more specifically, i.e., first-degree murder? A jurist
determines the level of specificity by considering the relevant features of
the act. All of the enumerated descriptions capture some aspect of the
act but omit other relevant features. One can "pull a trigger" or
"discharge a firearm" without harming another person so these
descriptions do not fully articulate the relevant features of the act. Nor
does "shooting another person" detail the extent of the harm inflicted.
The relevant features are that the agent intentionally killed another
person freely, with premeditation, and without justification. These are
the relevant features of first-degree murder because they characterize the
perniciousness of the crime and distinguish it from less heinous types of
killing. The relevant features govern the specification of the act as first-
degree murder and all are necessary for the act to be specified as such.
One relevant feature of any constitutional rights' claim is the
disputed law. Therefore, a jurist should not formulate the right in general
terms without reference to the disputed claim. In Michael H., the fact
that the conception of the child occurred in an act of adultery was
relevant because the statute explicitly limited a biological father's ability
to establish parenthood if the biological mother was married to another
man at the time of the conception.1 68 A jurist must address the adulterous
167. See generally Planned Parenthood of SE Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
168. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2006).
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conception in her rights' specification because the dispute would not
arise if this was not included in the statute. Therefore, the language of
the statute is relevant to the specification of the rights' claim and to the
application of governing precedents.
Additionally, a jurist could nevertheless recognize the biological
father's claim on grounds of the parent-child relationship, but only if she
could cite precedents or traditions that either made the parent-child right
absolute (in which case the adulterous character is rendered irrelevant) or
explicitly favored the parent-child right without regard to marriage.
Therefore the language of the statute is relevant to the specification of
the rights' claim and to the application of governing precedents.
Another relevant feature is the rights' claim of the plaintiff. Hence,
Plaintiffs such as Michael H. are afforded the opportunity to describe
their respective rights' claim as generally or specifically as they choose.
However, general rights' formulations are vulnerable to the contradiction
of numerous precedents or traditions. Statutes formulated in general
terms are similarly vulnerable. Thus, the language of both the statute and
the plaintiffs rights' claim must be sufficiently specific to avoid
contradicting precedent and historical tradition. And both the plaintiff
and the state must articulate their respective claims in terms that describe
the relevant features of the disputed act. Jurists can consult historical
traditions to determine if the circumstances that define such acts as
abortion, adultery, contraception, and suicide have been considered
relevant. The existence of such historical or legal traditions provides a
constitutional basis for relevance.
Some scholars, including Tribe and Dorf, suggest that the relevant
characteristics of any act are culturally relative.1 69  This claim
undermines jurisprudence because it denies both the objective reality of
difference and the existence of distinguishable acts. Murder would differ
from a beneficent act only by variable conventional criteria. 170 If these
acts can be distinguished then there exist some objective characteristics
of relevancy. 71  Moreover, the fact that legal systems worldwide
169. In discussing how the Justices could justify a right to abortion, but not
contraception, Tribe and Dorf state, "[p]erhaps the justices secretly adhere to a canon of
constitutional construction requiring that fundamental rights begin in vowels: abortion is
in, contraception is out. No one would actually argue for such a rule, but this fact is
socially and culturally contingent ... the criteria of relevance are themselves culturally
shaped." Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1076-77.
170. John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner's The
Problematics of Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1057, 1107 (2002) ("[T]he homicide
statutes that one finds in the world's legal systems are remarkably similar.").
171. Admittedly, some laws are social constructs, e.g., driving on the right-hand or
left-hand side of the road, but other laws are objectively grounded, e.g., murder. See id.
for a thorough discussion of this point.
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similarly criminalize many acts reveals that human beings are capable of
discerning the relevant characteristics of many acts. 
72
Tribe and Dorf cogently criticize one aspect of Justice Scalia's
theory. Justice Scalia claimed that if a jurist could not discover a
relevant tradition after initially specifying the right, he should then
determine the next most specific level and follow that tradition.173 Tribe
and Dorf correctly state that neither they nor Justice Scalia can determine
the next most specific level because no one can be certain of which
relevant factors to alter. 174 The disputed right can be reformulated in a
multitude of ways and Justice Scalia does not provide a metric for the
proper alternative specification. A jurist could abstract out the father's
sex and consult traditions of natural mothers who conceived children in
adulterous relationships, or perhaps they could consider the traditions
regarding unmarried fathers' rights when the mother was not married at
the time of conception.' 75 There is no metric of specificity that jurists
can consult to determine the next most specific level.
However, this criticism does not irreparably undermine Justice
Scalia's theory. Instead of seeking an alternative specification of the
rights' claim, Justice Scalia's theory should require the jurist to defer to
the extant statute rather than seeking an alternative tradition grounded on
the altered specification of the rights' claim. Hence, if a jurist cannot
find a "societal tradition either [supporting or denying the] rights of the
natural father of a child adulterously conceived,"' 176 then she should
uphold the statute. The statute should then be seen as the tradition. The
relevant issues of the dispute should constrain the jurist in the traditions
she consults, and if she finds none either supporting or refuting the
claims, she should defer to the statute by upholding it. If the California
statute and the relevant tradition have not made an exception for
biological fathers who have played a "major" role in the lives of their
children adulterously conceived, then neither should jurists in their
survey of relevant traditions. If the citizens of California change the
language of the statute, then the jurist should be governed by the altered
form.
Tribe's and Dorf's compelling criticism of Justice Scalia's search
for the "next most specific level" does not subvert his theory, but it does
172. See Mikhail, supra note 170, at 1107 (recounting current literature that reveals
much uniformity worldwide in legal codes).
173. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) ("If, for example, there
were no societal tradition... [the Court] would have to consult, and (if possible) reason
from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general.").
174. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1092.
175. Id. at 1090-91.
176. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
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vitiate their endeavor to specify Michael H.'s right in general terms.
Tribe and Dorf offer neither a "metric" by which to generalize this
disputed right nor the precise level of generality that should have been
applied in Michael H. They merely ask how "family relationships
worthy of protection do not include someone in Michael H.'s position
vis-i-vis his daughter."'' 77 Their deficiency arises not from their failure
to offer a metric, which is not possible, but of generating contradiction
by generalizing rights.
Moreover, Tribe's and Dorf's theory allows jurists to import their
values into law by framing the contested right in vacuous generalities.
This criticism is buttressed by Justice Brennan's opinion in Michael H. 178
Justice Brennan eschews appeals such as Tribe's and Dorf's to a general
right to "family" or "parenthood" because "it is absurd to assume that we
can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to pretend that we
do."' 17 9 Brennan's point is that although abstract terms such as "family"
or "parenthood" might garner a consensus, the substance of these terms
is disputed and therefore, the general term is useless.
More importantly though, Justice Brennan's criticism of attempts
such as Tribe's and Dorf's to generalize Michael H.'s rights' claim to
"family relationships" reveals the subjectivity inherent in generalizing
rights: no metric exists and therefore, jurists can generalize the right in
sundry ways, none of which, as Justice Brennan notes, contains a
particular content that commands assent.180 Remarkably, after criticizing
the use of general terms such as "family," Justice Brennan upholds
Michael H.'s rights by employing an even more general due process
right. For Justice Brennan, "'liberty' must include the freedom not to
conform.' 18' But this "liberty" would protect every individual who
engages in any practice legally proscribed, because every law requires
conformity. It is as absurd to think that people can agree on the content
of "the right not to conform" as "family" or "parenthood."'
' 82
Tribe and Dorf, Justice Brennan, and many other jurists generalize
rights' claims in seductive, vacuous terms, such as "family
relationships," "autonomy," or the "right to be let alone." But these terms
177. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1102.
178. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 136.
179. Id. at 127 n.6.
180. See Paul Brest, supra note 16, at 1089 ("Even assuming that general principles
can found in social consensus or derived by moral reasoning, the application of those
principles is highly indeterminate and subject to manipulation.").
181. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 ("In a community such as ours, 'liberty' must
include the freedom not to conform.").
182. Moreover, his claim for a "right not to conform" is subject to Tribe's & Dorf's
compelling criticism of the "right to be let alone." Indeed, nearly any generalized right is
subject to their potent reduction of the "right to be let alone."
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allow jurists to import their values when articulating the substance-
which has no constitutional basis-of these very formal terms. A right to
"family" seems innocuous until jurists delineate the content of "family"
which depends on the subjective values of the jurists. The right to
"family" could create constitutional rights for adulterous, abusive,
polygamous, gay, heterosexual, or bi-species relationships, depending on
the personal values of the jurist. The vacuous character of these general
rights allows jurists to impose their values when delineating the
substance of these rights. Justice Scalia's method precludes such judicial
activism.
C. Judicial Capitulation of Individual Rights
Tribe's and Dorf's third criticism is that Justice Scalia's theory
capitulates judicial protection of individual rights.1 83 Specifically, they
184criticize Justice Scalia's fourth footnote in Michael H., in which Scalia
criticized the practice of first determining whether a liberty is
fundamental and then determining whether the government's interest
overrides that liberty. Justice Scalia analogized the procedure of
isolating the liberty interest from its effect on other people to inquiring
whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun without asking whether
it is being discharged into another's body.
185
Tribe and Dorf claim that individual rights would be circumscribed
if jurists combined the method of the sixth footnote, which requires
historical traditions to be specified narrowly, 86 with the fourth footnote's
requirement that the government's interest must be included in the
formulation of the rights' claim.' 87  They state that the fundamental
character of any liberty interest would be lacking if the government's
justification for limiting the liberty is incorporated into the initial
definition of the liberty. 88 The liberty would be so specific that no
connection to precedent could be established. For example, the right to
privacy in Roe could be re-characterized as the right to destroy fetuses.'
89
183. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1086 ("[E]ven if Justice Scalia's program were
workable, it would achieve judicial neutrality by all but abdicating the judicial
responsibility to protect individual rights.").
184. Id. at 1096-97.
185. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 ("[L]ike inquiring whether there is a liberty interest
in firing a gun where the case at hand happens to involve its discharge into another
person.").
186. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1097.
187. Id.
188. Id. ("When we automatically incorporate the factors that provide the state's
possible justifications for its regulation into the initial definition of a liberty, the
fundamental nature of that liberty nearly vanishes.").
189. Id. ("At a minimum, the privacy right protected in Roe becomes the implausible
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Part III, section B above revealed that Justice Scalia's criticism of
the two-step process is probative. To employ Justice Scalia's example
and Tribe's and Dorf's method, an individual could generalize her right
to fire a gun (or any other act) as a right to autonomy, because it is
important to personhood, and instantly claim a fundamental due process
liberty right. 190 But as discussed above, there is no general right to
liberty or to fire a gun. There are specific acts of liberty and specific acts
of firing guns that one can justify, but no such general rights. Before a
jurist can determine if a particular right exists, she must justify the right
to the act in those particular circumstances by specifying all the relevant
factors that condition the rights' claim.
Tribe and Dorf similarly criticize Justice Scalia's use of "legal
'cognizable' traditions" because such a term constitutes majoritarian
values and therefore "one cannot comfortably look to tradition to bolster
the judicial role as protector of individual rights against the state."' 91 But
this criticism begs the question of whether the judiciary's role is to
expand certain liberties or to adjudicate according to established and
reasonable jurisprudential principle. The criticism that Justice Scalia's
originalism could generate rulings "unacceptable" to some is valid
insofar as originalism often acquiesces to American democratic
majorities, which historically have enacted unjust laws, particularly in
regard to race. 192  But no scholar has yet offered a theory of
jurisprudence that is impervious to unacceptable results. Either the
people (through their representatives) or the judiciary can err by
establishing unjust laws; the judiciary is no more infallible than the
people on a purely consequential metric. 193 Historically, many American
states did not exhibit the racist tendencies that afflicted many jurists.
Liberal scholars often speak of the rights' conflict of "the
individual" and "the state," which conjures up images of a defenseless
,right' to destroy a fetus.").
190. Schauer, supra note 136, at 440 ("[T]he Due Process clause has been interpreted
in a way that threatens to make most, if not all, of the remainder of the document [the
Constitution] superfluous.").
191. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1087.
192. Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349, 379
(1992) ("Hypothetical horribles start from the belief that a legislature has done what no
reasonable person could want.").
193. See Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REv. 123, 129
(2005) (Sunstein cites nine cases in which he implies that the Court erred. "The Court's
conception of what principle requires, and its understanding of what it means to defend
"minority rights," should not be taken as unerring. From the moral point of view,
insulation from majoritarian pressures is sometimes the problem, not the solution.");
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 57 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1980) (disputes that jurists are more dispassionate than legislators by asking
rhetorically whether Taney was better than Lincoln).
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individual suffering at the hands of the monolithic and authoritarian
government. We do not discount the instances in which state officials
act ultra vires, such as by illegally wire-tapping a citizen's house or
falsifying evidence in a trial. However, in these cases the state officials
are not acting according to the established law of the state.
But most of the controversial rights' disputes do not pit an
individual against the state, but rather involve the discrepant rights'
claims of a minority and majority of individuals, who, in most cases were
allowed to establish the law either directly or by their elected
representatives. The more fundamental question is why the judiciary
must favor the minority, rather than weigh equally the liberty claims of
the majority and minority. However, Tribe's and Dorf's derogation is
probative only if one adopts their constitutional ideology, namely, that
the role of the judiciary is to expand individual rights. 
194
Therefore, Tribe and Dorf are mistaken in asserting that liberties
would be curtailed by narrowly specified rights' claims. 95 Only those
without a basis in the traditions and history of the United States would be
precluded. Other practices that have not been legally regulated could be
recognized as rights if the state attempts to proscribe these historical
practices. Alternatively, even those practices without a historical basis
could become novel rights through the democratic process. Therefore,
the citizens would not be burdened with counterintuitive originalist
rulings because the majority would be free to proscribe them.' 
96
The challenge for liberal scholars is that they must argue that a
novel rights' claim is fundamental and that it is constitutionally
grounded. Originalists justify the claim by the right's existence in the
country's traditions and precedents. Liberals and progressives do not
want to be limited to historical practices, yet they must find some
constitutional basis for the new right. The only solution for bridging this
chasm between novel claim and the historicity of the Constitution is
through the notion of general rights, which are so vague that they
encompass both the novel and the traditional.
194. Tribe, supra note 151, at 944-46. "It is crucial, in asking whether an alleged
right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define the liberty at a high enough level of
generality to permit unconventional variants to claim protection along with mainstream
versions of protected conduct." Id. at 946.
195. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 15, at 1093 ("Justice Scalia is aware that the method of
footnote [six] would severely curtail the Supreme Court's role in protecting individual
liberties.").
196. Hence, even the most opprobrious consequences that originalism might entail in
the minds of its critics, such as the proscription of contraceptive use or the recognition of




Thomas Hobbes introduced modem philosophy to the radical notion
of voluntarism, i.e., the good is whatever I desire. 197 Although appealing
in concept, voluntarism creates an impediment to the political ordering of
discrepant desires. Hobbes offered the Leviathan as a solution: each
citizen sacrifices some desires for the sake of bodily safety that the all-
powerful and unassailable Leviathan guarantees.
One strand of modem philosophical thought has attempted to
construct moral and political theories grounded on Hobbes' notion of
voluntarism liberated from the authoritarian Leviathan.198 John Stuart
Mill's theory of liberty outlined an influential scheme of governance
predicated on a notion of liberty that is voluntarist in character, albeit not
consistently. The crux of his theory of liberty is articulated in the Harm
principle, viz., that an individual retains liberty until his actions harm
another.199 One shortcoming of the principle is obvious: the very notion
of what constitutes harm for an individual will be entirely subordinate to
her wants. For those who want to avoid physical pain, state proscriptions
of assisted-suicide are harmful to the individual; to those who think
human life is a fundamental good, assisted-suicide is harmful because it
devalues that which they hold dear. Any individual denied her desire
suffers some type of harm, be it physical, psychological, or financial. °°
Therefore, practitioners and opponents of any act, whether it be abortion,
public exhibitionism, shouting in a movie theater, murder or jay-walking,
suffer harm when denied their liberty, i.e., doing what they want.
Some method must be adopted to resolve the conflicts among
discrepant wants. Despite their best efforts, scholars have failed to
produce a metric for weighing pleasure, or correlatively, measuring
197. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 120-21 (Prometheus Books 1985) (1651) ("But
whatsoever is the object of any man's Appetite or Desire: that is it, which he for his part
calleth Good; and the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; and of his Contempt, Vile,
and Inconsiderable.").
198. One of the most influential of Hobbes progeny was David Hume. DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 574 (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch eds., Oxford
University Press 2nd ed. 1978) (1739-40) ("We have already observed, that moral
distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that
whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or
reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature that gives uneasiness is
vicious.").
199. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 165 (H.B. Acton, ed., 1972) ("The
principle of liberty requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow:
without impediment form our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm
them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.").
200. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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harm, because these are not quantifiable entities.2 ' The only quantitative
method of mediating these voluntaristic disputes is that of
majoritarianism: assign each person's desire equal weight and count
heads. Of course this method can generate gross injustices against any
minority, and contemporary liberal theorists have relied on the concept
of individual rights to protect individuals against certain injustices that a
202democratic majority could perpetrate. The liberalist conception of
rights maintains that just one person's right can trump the majority's
desires.
Social-contract theory provides a rationale for upholding the
individual's counter-majoritarian right's claim because the governing
constitution binds all citizens by its terms, and if the Constitution
protects a specific individual right then the individual can coherently
claim that right in the face of the majority's disapproval. But because the
United States Constitution does not explicitly protect most individual
rights' claims, proponents invoke the Due Process Clause's guarantee of
a general right to liberty.
The untenability of this legal claim is patent: the individuals
constituting either the majority or the minority are seeking to legalize
their liberty (or wants) and those individuals' denied by law endure the
harm of a frustrated want. Although either the legislature or the judiciary
inflicts harm on the group of individuals whose desires are proscribed,
legislatures can appeal to the principle of majority rule, but jurists are
bereft of principled justifications.
The Supreme Court could claim that one party to the dispute suffers
greater harm, but this would require justices either to quantify desires-
which is impossible-or rank the harms, which requires an axiology of
desires, for which there exists no constitutional basis. Judicial appeals to
public sensibilities or consensus would violate the right of the individual
to construct and enact his own axiology. Moreover, ranking desires
requires some version of the good because the prevailing desires must be
judged as more important than others.20 3 But the imposition of a view of
the good-that favored by a majority of the Court-violates the liberal
tenet that the government must not impose its view of the good on
201. For the most ambitious utilitarian attempt to quantify desires, see R.M. HARE,
MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS METHOD AND POINT 117-29 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
202. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 360-65 (Harvard University Press
1985) (arguing that neutral utilitarianism, in which each person is allowed a vote to
express his preference, would permit Nazism).
203. See RAZ, supra note 107, at 414 ("Since 'causing harm' entails by its very
meaning that the action is prima facie wrong, it is a normative concept acquiring its
specific meaning from the moral theory within which it is embedded. Without such a
connection to a moral theory, the harm principle is a formal principle lacking specific




The Supreme Court has explicitly embraced a voluntarist view of
the good in its principles of liberty, autonomy, and privacy.205 But the
Court cannot distinguish among desires without recourse to a view of the
good, which the Court conceals by formulating the rights' claim in terms
so general that some precedent applies. By generalizing rights, justices
are able to invoke some analogous precedent, thereby, preserving the
veneer of principled jurisprudence. But any desire can be similarly
generalized so that myriad precedents apply.
Law must be principled or it is merely the imposition of force by the
empowered.20 6 Generalizing law vitiates its character as law because it
fosters unprincipled jurisprudence. Then-Chief Justice nominee John
Roberts appropriately expressed perplexity at the concept of a general
right to privacy: the concept of a prescriptive general right is
indefensible and the notion of a general due process liberty right is self-
contradictory. The Supreme Court must eschew general rights and seek
refuge in principled specification. Justice Scalia offers a compelling
alternative.
204. See id. at 191 (asserting that equality "supposes that political decisions must be,
so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what
gives value to life."); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 191-94 (Columbia Univ. Press
1993) (offering a more philosophical basis than Dworkin does for neutrality); CHARLES E.
LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 67 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987) ("A
commitment to treating others with equal respect forms the ultimate reason why in the
face of disagreement we should keep the conversation going, and to do that, of course, we
must retreat to neutral ground.").
205. See Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of life."); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619 (1984) (The right to privacy protects "the ability independently to define one's
identity."); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(The right to privacy protects liberties such as "the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personalities.")
(emphasis added).
206. Bork, supra note 16 ("This is, I think, the ultimate reason the Court must be
principled. If it does not have and rigorously adhere to a valid and consistent theory of
majority and minority freedoms based upon the Constitution, judicial supremacy, given
the axioms of our system, is, precisely to that extent, illegitimate.").
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